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I.
STATEMENT
A.

THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises from a lawsuit filed by Tim and Janet Thompson and

Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. against the City of Lewiston for a flood which
occurred on its property as a result of a heavy rain storm which struck the City of
Lewiston on May 19, 2006.

The Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc.

sued the City of Lewiston claiming damages allegedly caused by the flood.
the suit was filed, the Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales,

After

Inc. filed

bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Trustee, Barry Zimmerman substituted in for the
Thompsons and Thompson's Auto Sales, Inc. (For convenience and in accordance
with I.A.R. 35(d), the Appellants will be hereinafter referred to as "the Thompsons"
and the Respondent will hereinafter be referred to as lfThe City".) The City filed a
Motion

for

Summary

discretionary immunity.

Judgment

on

the

grounds

design

immunity

and

The District Court granted the City summary judgment on

the grounds of discretionary immunity. The Thompsons have appealed the Court's
Decision,

In their initial brief, the Thompsons have also raised the issue of design

immunity.

B.

PROCEEDINGS
The City agrees with the Thompsons' description
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the Course of Proceedings

up to the time of the District Court's decision regarding the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated March 20, 2008. Additionally, the City submits that the
Course of Proceedings should include the events that occurred after March 20,
2008. After the Honorable District Judge Carl Kerrick issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds of discretionary immunity on March 20, 2008, both parties filed Motions
for Reconsideration.

Both Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the Court

on June 17, 2008. However, the District Court's decisions of March 20, 2008 and
June 17, 2008 did not end the litigation.

The District Court also ruled that there

were material questions of fact with regard to Thompsons' claims of negligent
maintenance.
The Thompsons then filed a Petition with the Idaho Supreme Court for
Permissive Appeai on Juiy 2, 2008.

The District Court granted the Piaintiffs:

Motion to file a Permissive Appeal on August 2, 2008. The Motion was filed with
the Idaho Supreme Court.

On October 30, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the

Motion for Permissive Appeal.
Thereafter, the parties resumed the litigation process.

Shortly before the

triai regarding the Thompsons' claim of negligent maintenance, the Thompsons
conceded that they did not have sufficient evidence to establish a claim of
negligent maintenance. At the same time,

however, the Thompsons sought

permission from the District Court to file an Amended Complaint which would add
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claims of continuing trespass and continuing

nuisance.

The District Court

dismissed the negligent maintenance claims and allowed an Amended Complaint to
be filed on October 15, 2009.

The Thompsons then filed for bankruptcy relief

pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11, United States Code.

As a result of the

bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Trustee, Barry Zimmerman, was substituted for the
Plaintiffs on November 10, 2010 and the litigation moved forward.
On July 1 5, 2011, the City filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment to
dismiss the claim for continuing nuisance and continuing trespass.

On July 26,

2011, the District Court granted the City's Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thereafter, a Judgment was entered on February 29, 2012 by the District Court
dismissing the Plaintiffs' claim.

However, there is no evidence or documentation

within the Court record that that the District Court's Judgment dated February 29,
2012 vvas sent to the Thornpsons or their aitorney. As a resuit, on or about Juiy
5, 2012, the District Court issued an Order granting relief from the Judgment of
February 29, 2012 and reissued

Judgment on July 5, 2012. The Plaintiffs filed

a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 2012 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on July
30, 2012.

The Notice of Appeal, the Amended Notice of Appeal and Appellant's

Initial Brief raise and discuss issues regarding discretionary immunity.
Appellant's Initial Brief also raises the issue of design immunity.

The

The Thompsons

have not, however, raised any issue pertaining to the dismissal of the claims of
continuing nuisance and continuing trespass.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or before May 19, 2006, the Thompsons owned a parcel of property at

306 21 st St. in Lewiston, Idaho, on which Thompson's Auto Sales sold used cars
and boats. The property is located in Lewiston, Idaho near the bottom of a hill and
is adjacent to 21 st Street which descends down the hill in a south to north
direction. The Thompsons' property is bounded on the south by Idaho Street
(which is at a higher elevation than the Thompsons' property), and on the north by
G Street (which is at a lower elevation than the Thompsons' property).

The

property is bounded on the east by 21 st Street.
Prior to 2003, at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street, storm
water flowing down 21 st Street was transported across Idaho Street through a
valley gutter which was installed in the early 1990's.
In 2003, the valiey gutter was causing traffic probiems. Due to the extreme
dip of the valley gutter, cars had to slow down to turn onto Idaho Street to avoid
the bottom of the car striking the pavement. A

of John Watson, , 4, R. 33.

Because of those traffic problems and other reasons, in May, 2003, Assistant City
Engineer John Watson prepared a schematic or plan as a part of the 2003 Summer
Street Maintenance Project to change the storm gutter system from a valiey gutter
to a bubble-up gutter at the intersection
of Lewiston. Affidavit of John

21 st Street and Idaho Street in the City

"

3 and 4, R 33.

Included as a part of

the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project 'Nas a schematic for the installation
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of the bubble-up system which would be placed under Idaho Street where it
intersects with 21 5t Street. Affidavit of John Watson, "

4 - 5 and Ex. A, R. 33.

The bubble-up system was designed to catch runoff water as it traveled
down 21 st Street, allow the water to pass under Idaho Street, and bubble-up into
the gutter on 21 st Street below the intersection.

The storm water would then

continue on down the gutter on 21 st Street.
Shortly thereafter, in late May, 2003, the City prepared and sent out bid
documents containing project plans and other information about the 2003 Summer
Street Maintenance Project to various contractors. Affidavit of John Watson, , 6,
R. 33. Contractors who were interested in working on the project submitted their
bids to the City.

Watson,

The bids were reviewed by Mr. Watson.

'6 -

7, R. 33 - 34.

Affidavit of John

After reviewing the bids, Mr. Watson prepared a

memorandum dated June 9, 2003 to the City's Purchasing Division, recommending
Poe Asphalt & Paving be given the contract for the 2003 Summer Street
Maintenance Project because it was the low bidder. Affidavit of John Watson, "
6 - 8, R. 33 - 34. Included in that memorandum was a "bid tabulation" for several
the contractors who bid on the street maintenance project.

ItVatson, ,

6, R. 33 - 34.

ffidavit of John

The bid tabulation contained a table specifically

identifying the items that the contractors would be responsible for purchasing and
installing as part of the street maintenance project. Affidavit of John Watson, Ex.
B. On that table, item No.
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603~ 1,

R. 50 described a catch basin, !\tvo of which

were required for the street maintenance project.

Affidavit of John Watson, , 7

and Ex. B. Item 605-1, R. 50, the table also listed twelve inch PVC storm sewer
pipe. Affidavit of John Watson, , 7 and Ex. B, R. 50. Both of these item numbers
correspond with the design for the bubble-up system which had been prepared by
Mr. Watson. Affidavit of John Watson, , 7 R. 34.
f

After Mr. Watson's memorandum was submitted to the City Purchasing
Division, it was forwarded to the City Clerk. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, , 5, R. 55.
The document was then attached to the agenda for the June 9, 2003 Lewiston
City Council meeting, and copies were prepared for the Council members. Affidavit

of Kari Kuchmak, Ex. A, , 4 R. 55.
On June 9, 2003, the Lewiston City Council met at 7:00 p.m. at Lewis and
Clark State College. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, , 8, R. 55. Item H on the consent
agenda was the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project.

Ex. A, 'V. H. R. 57 - 58.
show that the 2003

Affidavit

i{ad

The minutes for the City Council meeting

Summer Street Maintenance Project was

approved by the City Council. Affidavit of

unanimously

Kuchmak, Ex. C, 'V. H, R. 66 - 71.

On June 12, 2003, the City of Lewiston sent a notification to Poe Asphalt &
Paving that it had been awarded the contract for the 2003 Summer Street
Maintenance Project.

Affidavit of John Watson, , 9, R. 34.

Thereafter, on June

26, 2003, the City of Lewiston sent Poe Asphalt and Paving a Notice to Proceed
with the work on the project. Affidavit of
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Watson, , 10, R. 34. Poe Asphalt

was to begin work on June 27, 2003, and was required to complete the work by
September 15, 2003. Affidavit of John Watson, Ex. 0, R. 53, The change in the
storm drain system was completed in 2003.
Several years later, on May 19, 2006, a sudden thunderstorm dumped a
large amount of rain on the Lewiston area in a short period of time.
Thompsons filed a Complaint against the City on January 29, 2007.

The

(Complaint,

R. 14 - 18). According to the Thompsons, runoff water traveled down 21 st Street
towards their property. (Complaint, 'V, R. 16). Plaintiffs allege that the bubble-up
system was ineffective, and allowed a portion of the storm water to run across the
surface of Idaho Street, flowing in a northwest direction, over the Thompsons'
sidewalk

and

(Complaint,

onto

'V. R,

the

Thompsons'

property

allegedly

causing

damages.

16).
II
II.

1.

ISSUES

Following

are

Respondents'

restated

issues on appeal:
V\Jhen the District Court dismissed Thompsons claims based on discretionary
immunity as provided in i.C.§6-904(1), did it err in concluding that discretionary
immunity was applicable to the decision to change the type of storm water gutter
system at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street in Lewiston, Idaho?
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2. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
When the District Court denied The City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds of design immunity as provided in I.C. § 6-904(7), did it err in concluding
that design immunity was not applicable when the City Council approved the bids
for the 2003 Summer Street Maintenance Project which included the change in
the storm water gutter system at the intersection of 21 st Street and Idaho Street
in Lewiston, Idaho ..
The City acknowledges that the Appellant's Opening Brief raises the issue of
whether the District Court properly granted the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity as allowed by I.C. §6-904(1}.
In addition, the City asserts that the Thompsons' Opening Brief also raises the
issue of whether the District Court properly denied the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to design immunity as allowed by I.C. 6-904(7}.

In

determining what issues are being appealed, raj reviewing court looks only to the
initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the arguments and
authority to

which

Respondent's Brief.

the

Respondent has an

See Marcia

211, 159 P.3d 840, 848 citing

opportunity to

Turner v. City

respond

in the

144 Idaho 203,

v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120,

122 (2005).
In the Thompsons' initial Brief, the Thompsons raised, argued and discussed
the issue of design immunity. The design immunity issue is clearly contained and
discussed by the Thompsons initial Brief at pages 10

13 and 17 - 20.

As a

result, the City of Lewiston asserts that the District Court's Decision denying the
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City! s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of design immunity should be
revisited and re-examined by this Court.
III.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The City of Lewiston is not claiming for an award of attorney! s fees on
appeal.
IV.
ARGUMENT

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an appeal for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment,
the appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the
motion. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011). The appellate
court construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from the record,
in favor of the non-moving party.
evidence in

Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the

record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of

material fact regarding the issues stated in the pleadings and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., citing, Infanger

of Salmon, 137

Idaho 45, 46-47 (2002). A trial court's determination of whether a legal duty existed
under the circumstances is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises
free review.
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V.

Juker, 119 Idaho 555,556-57 (1991).

On a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party bears the burden of
proving the absence of a material fact, and all evidence is construed liberally and all
reasonable inferences are made in favor of the non-moving party. Sherer v. Pocatello
School District No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489 (2006).

After the moving party has

satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with sufficient
admissible evidence identifying specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine
issue for trial. Id. at 489-90; IRep 56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or
depositions as well as other material based upon personal knowledge which would have
been admissible at trial. Id. at 490, citing Harris v. State, Department of Health and
Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,297-98 (1992). Although circumstantial evidence can create a

genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Sherer, supra, 143 Idaho at 490.
B.

DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
Discretionary Immunity arises from

I.e.

§6-904(1) of the Idaho Tort

Claims Act. That statute provides:

A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall
not be liable for any claim which:
1.
Arises out of any act or omiSSion of an employee of the
governmental entity exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the
execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or
not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether
or not the discretion be abused.
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JJThe discretionary function exception applies to governmental decisions
entailing planning or policy formation." Dorea Enter,
Idaho 422, 425, 163 P.3d 211, 214 (2007).

v. City of Blackfoot, 144

A two-step process is followed to

determine the applicability of the exception. Id.
The first step is to examine the nature and quality of the
challenged actions.
"Routine, everyday matters not
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors will more
likely than not be 'operational.' Decisions involving a
consideration of the financial, political, economic and
social effects of a policy or plan will generally be planning
and' discretionary.
fI,

"While greater rank or authority will most likely coincide
with greater responsibility for planning or policy formation
decisions; . . . those with the least authority may, on
occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the
ambit of the discretionary function exception.
The
second step is to examine the underlying policies of the
discretionary function, which are: to permit those who
govern to do so without being unduly inhibited by the
threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also, to limit
judicial re-examination of the basic policy decisions
properly entrusted to other branches of government.
II

(internal citations omitted).
This Court must first consider whether the determination to replace the
valley gutter system with a catch basin and bubble-up system was a discretionary
or operational decision.
determinations

made

"[T]he discretionary function exception generally includes
by executives

or administrations

in

establishing

plans,

specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment
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and decision there is discretion."

City of lewiston v. lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,

855, 853 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1993).
In this case, the Thompsons have alleged that this matter is properly
considered under design immunity, I.C. §6-904(7) and discretionary immunity does
not apply. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12).

The Thompsons further argue that design

immunity and discretionary immunity are mutual exclusive citing Bingham v. Idaho
Department of Transportation, 117 Idaho 147, 786 P.2d 538 (1990). However, in
Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P.2d 330 (1994), the Idaho court

acknowledged that either I.C.§6-904(1) or I.C. §6-904(7) may apply to decisions
pertaining to traffic intersection design.

The Lawton, case, supra, involved a

personal injury claim wherein the design of an intersection was at issue.

One of

the issues was whether discretionary immunity identified in I.C. §6-904(1) was
applicab!e.

!n clarification, the Lall'.!ton Court noted that either I.C.

I.C. §6-904(7}

be applicable.

§6~904( 1)

or

The lawton Court noted that if there was plan

or design of the highway, then, I.C. §6-904(7} should be reviewed to see if there
was immunity. If, on the other hand, there was no plan or design, the Court would
be required to determine whether the City was entitled to discretionary immunity
under I.C. §6-904(1). lawton, supra, at 460.
Here, according to the Thompsons' expert, "While the project contract plans
are stamped by John Watson, a Registered Engineer, they do not qualify as
engineering design plans in that they lack technical design detail sufficient to insure
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 12

the installation that would have a comparable functional capacity to the concrete
alley gutter being removed.

(Plaintiffs'

Summary Judgment, p, 3, R. 90).

Response to Defendant's Motion for

According to Roger H. Tutty, P.E. Plaintiffs'

expert witness, the City's contract plans are deficient and fail to qualify as
engineering design plans, in that, among other things, they fail to specify sizes,
limits, slope measurements and other design parameters essential to
design's intended functional capacity.
for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R.

fI

ensure the

(Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion

90). Thus, the Thompsons, by asserting there is

no plan or design, portray this matter as one in which discretionary immunity under
I.C. §6-904(1) may apply.
to

absolute

immunity

Under I.C. §6-904(1), a governmental entity is entitled

regarding

claims

arising

from

the

performance

of

a

discretionary function. lawton v. City of Pocatello, supra, at 460.
As noted in Dorea Enterprises v. City of Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422,

1

~")

I VV

D
I

,,),..1

oVU

211 (2007), when a Court is determining whether discretionary immunity applies,
the analysis is a two-step process.

The first step is to determine or examine the

nature and quality of the challenged actions.
requiring

evaluation

or

broad

policy

factors

Routine, everyday matters not
will

more

likely

than

not

be

"operational." Decisions involving consideration of the financial, political, economic
and social effects of a policy or plan will generally be planning and discretionary.
Dorea,

at 425,

743 P.2d 70,73 (1987).
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v. City

Garden

113 Idaho

,205,

In the case at hand, the decision to change the valley storm drain system to
the bubble-up gutter system was one which considered and factored in traffic
flows and the safety of drivers. According to the Affidavit of John Watson, when
he designed a plan for removing a three foot wide valley gutter which crossed
Idaho Street at the intersections of Idaho Street and 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho,
one of the reasons for the removal of the valley gutter was because it was causing
traffic problems.

Affidavit of John Watson, err 4, R. 33.

Nothing in the record

suggests the implementation of the Street Maintenance Project was an operational,
or everyday function.

Further, the Thompsons have not introduced any evidence

that the replacement of the gutter was an everyday decision. Therefore, the first
step of discretionary immunity analysis has been met.
The second step of the discretionary immunity analysis is to evaluate the
underlying policies to determine if it is discretionary or OPeiational.

As noted

above, if the decision is based upon consideration of its financial, political,
economic or social

it is discretionary.

If the decision is a daily, routine

decision not involving the consideration of policy factors, it is operational.

Dorea,

supra, at 425.

In this case, the decision to change from a valley gutter to a bubble-up gutter
was made by John Watson, the City's Assistant Engineer.

The primary basis for

the decision was that the three foot valley gutter was impeding traffic on 21 st
Street and posed a safety hazard to drivers, According to Mr. Watson's Affidavit,
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 14

cars had to slow down as they turned onto Idaho Street to avoid striking the
pavement

to the extreme dip of the valley gutter. Affidavit

John Watson,

'l1

4, R. 33.
The City submits that the decision to change the gutter system to facilitate traffic
safety is a discretionary decision. Under I.C. §§50-313 and 50-314, Cities have fairly
broad authority over their streets and traffic. Idaho Courts have recognized that closing
streets or regulating the kind of traffic on them is a discretionary matter vested in the
City's governing board and are a discretionary decision and fall within the discretionary
immunity under I.C. §6-904(1). Christensen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 139,
124 P.3d 1008 (2005).
As this Court is well aware, the underlying policies of discretionary function
immunity is "to permit those who govern to do so without being inhibited by the
threat of liability for tortious conduct and to limit judicial re-examination of policy
decisions entrusted to other branches of government.
Here, the decision to replace

II

supra, at 426.

valley gutter with a bubble-up and catch

system due to traffic concerns is a discretionary function.

Therefore the decision

to make the change in the gutter system is protected by the discretionary immunity
provided by I. C. §6-904( 1}.
The Thompsons have asserted that Mr. Watson did not have the requisite
authority and failed to make a sufficient study of the traffic issues before deciding
to utilize the bubble-up gutter system. The City disputes those arguments. Under
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Idaho law, [wJhile greater rank or authority will most likely coincide with greater
responsibility for planning or policy formation decisions; ... those with the least
authority may, on occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the ambit of
the discretionary function exception. Dorea, supra at 425.

As noted above, Mr.

Watson was an Assistant Engineer for the City of Lewiston.

Watson,

~3,

Affidavit of John

R. 33. Additionally, Mr. Watson's decision and design of the bubble-

up gutter system was approved by the Lowell Cutshaw, City of Lewiston's
Engineer. Affidavit of Lowell Cutshaw,

~~

2 - 4, R. 213.

Similarly, the change of

the storm drain system from a valley gutter to a bubble-up gutter system, was
approved by the then, City of Lewiston, Director of Public Works, Joel Ristau.

Affidavit of Joel Ristau,

11 4,

R. 206 -208. Thus, the change of the gutter system

from a valley gutter to a bubble up gutter system was approved by mUltiple, high
ranking

Cit",

employees,

~v~r.

\"Jatson,

the

City's

Assistant

Engineei,

Lovvell

Cutshaw, the City Engineer and Joel Ristau, the City's Director of Public Works.
The Thompsons also argue that Mr. Watson did not conduct sufficient
studies or gather sufficient information, concerning the change of gutter system.
However, the statute providing discretionary immunity does not require or specify
that a specific amount of data or tests be conducted.

The Thompsons have not

cited any statute, regulation or case law which requires some sort of study or
research before discretionary immunity applies.
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Accordingly, the City submits that the District Court properly held that
discretionary immunity is applicable to this situation. It is clear that the decision to
change the type of gutter system was based upon a traffic consideration. This
Court has previously held that traffic considerations are discretionary decisions to
which discretionary immunity attaches. Further, the decision to change the type of
gutter system based upon traffic considerations was made and/or approved by the
Assistant City Engineer, the City Engineer and the Director of Public Works. Also,
the City Council also approved the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project and the
funds for the project which included and/or incorporated the change of the gutter
system.

Thus, the City's decision to change the type of gutter system is a

discretionary decision and the District Court's ruling granting the City Summary
Judgment on that basis should be affirmed.

C, DESIGN IMMUN!TY
As noted above, the Thompsons have raised and spent several pages in their
initial Brief discussing design immunity.

The City asserts that such a discussion

raises the issue of whether the District Court properly denied the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the grounds of design immunity. The City asserts that the
District Court erred when it denied the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the grounds of design immunity and that this Court should reverse that decision.
The concept of design immunity is set forth in I.C. § 6-904(7} provides a
"governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
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of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any
ciaim which:"

7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or
improvements to the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or
other public property where such plan or design is
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or
design standards in effect at the time of preparation of
the plan or design or approved in advance of the
construction by the legislative body of the governmental
entity or by some other body or administrative agency,
exercising discretion by authority to give such approval.
In order to qualify for design immunity, the City is "required to establish the
existence of a plan or design that was either prepared in substantial conformance
with existing engineering or design standards or approved in advance by the
legislative or administrative authority./I

Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho

454,459, 886 P,2d 330, 335 (1994) (emphasis in original).
In this case, neither party has identified any specific engineering or design
standards which existed in 2003 which

the volume of water which must

be accommodated or handled by the storm water gutter system. The Thompsons
and their experts or the City have failed to identified an existing engineering or
design standard which enunciates or identifies the volume of water which a storm
water system must accommodate adjacent to a city street, such as the rain from a

5 year storm, 10 year storm, 25 year storm or 100 year storm.

Apparently, the

Plaintiffs' expert assumes, without any basis, that if any water escapes the storm
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 18

water system, it is defective or inadequate.

In effect, the Plaintiffs' expert is

attempting to impose strict liability upon the City.

The City submits that such a

position is not supported by Idaho law.

In Lawton, supra, at 459, the Court notes that I.C. § 6-904(7) does not
require a written plan.

Here, as noted above, the City's Assistant Engineer, John

Watson, drew and stamped a drawing pertaining to the bubble-up gutter system.
Because Idaho law does not require the plan to be in writing, the fact that the
design prepared by Mr. Watson is sufficient to constitute a plan under I.C. §6904(7).

Further, because a plan does not have to be in writing, the alleged

deficiencies in the plan

identified

by the Thompsons expert,

i.e., the lack

specifications such as sizes, slope measurements and other specifications do not
support the argument that no plan exists.
Although there are no existing standardized engineering or design standards
pertaining to the volume of water which must be contained by a City gutter
system,

the

City

submits that

Mr.

's

drawing,

combined

with

the

descriptions and/or contained in the bid tabulations, provided contractors with
sufficient information to bid on and install the bubble-up gutter system. Thus, the
City submits that the drawing prepared by the City's Assistant Engineer, John
Watson, approved by the City Engineer, Lowell Cutshaw and the City's Director of
Public Works,

Joel

Ristau

is

a project

which

was

prepared

in substantial

conformance with engineering or design standards. (There has been no claim or
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allegation that the bubble-up gutter system was not constructed in accordance
with the design). Thus, the City would assert that the City has met the first option
for design immunity under I.C. 6-904(7), i.e., that the design was in substantial
conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time of
preparation of the plan.
Additionally, design immunity specifications contained in the Idaho statute
allows an alternative means to qualify for design immunity.

Design immunity is

also applicable if the plan is approved by the legislative body or administrative
authority of the governmental entity and is obtained prior to the commencement of
construction. Here, the record is clear that Mr. Watson, the City's Assistant
Engineer prepared the plan/schematic for the bubble-up gutter system in May of

2003. Affidavit of John Watson, , 4, R. 33.

It is also undisputed that the plans

were also approved by the then, City Engineer, Lowe!! Cutshaw.

Affidavit of

Cutshaw, 'IT 3, R. 213. Also, Mr. Ristau, the City's Public Works Director in

2003 approved the plan to modify the storm water system at the intersection of
Idaho Street and 21 5t Street. Affidavit of Joel

~,

2 - 4, R. 207.

In addition to Mr. Watson's design being approved by several qualified City
employees, the project was also approved by the City Council before construction
commenced.

After the various bids were obtained, the matter was submitted to

the Lewiston City Council for approval.

According to the agenda of the Lewiston

Council, the 2003 Summer Maintenance
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was item V (H)

the City

Council Agenda for the meeting on June 9, 2009. Affidavit of Kari Kuchmak, ~ ~ 6
- 8, R. 55. The minutes from the City Council meeting on June 9, 2009, indicates
that the City accepted the bid from Poe Asphalt, for work included in the Summer
Maintenance Project (which included the installation of the bubble-up gutter
system)

and

approved the expenditure of

$855,557.46.

Affidavit of Kari

Kuchmak, ~ V. H., Exhibit C, R. 60. Construction for the 2003 Summer Maintenance
Project was authorized to commence in the fall on June 27, 2003. Affidavit of John

Watson, Exhibit 0, R. 53.

Thus, it is the City's position that the bubble-up gutter

system which was part of the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project was approved by
the City's employees and the City Council prior to the construction of the project
and/or was approved by those administrators responsible for construction or
remodeling of City streets.
The Thompsons

concede that the

City considered

bid

approved the expenditure for the 2003 Street Maintenance Project.
Thompsons assert that there is no evidence that

proposals and
However, the

design or plan for the

storm drain modification was approved by the City Council. In support of the
argument, the Thompsons rely upon the case of

State, Department of

Public Works, 124 Idaho 658. 862 P.2d 1080 (1993). The Morgan case, however,
is distinguishable from this situation. in Morgan;

the Court specifically noted

that there was no evidence that the Chief of the Bureau of Building Services had
the authority to approve the modification design.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 21

Here, the Affidavit of Lowell Cutshaw, City Engineer clearly asserts that he
had the authority to and did approve the plans prepared by the Assistant City
Engineer, John Watson for the installation of the bubble-up system.

Lowell Cutshaw,

11

3, R. 213.

Affidavit of

Similarly, the Affidavit of Joel Ristau, the City's

Director of Public Works in 2003 also acknowledged that the City Engineer had the
authority to prepare plans to modify the water system at the intersection of 21 st
Street and Idaho Street. Affidavit of Joel Ristau,

1111

3 and 4, R. 207.

Finally, the

Affidavit of Janice Vassar, former City Manager for the City of Lewiston from
1992 - 2006, also acknowledged that the City Engineering Department and/or the
Public Works Director would have authority to approve maintenance projects,
including the 2003 Summer Maintenance Project. Affidavit of Janice Vassar, "

7-

10. R 252 - 253. Accordingly, that the City Engineer and the Director of the Public
Works Department had the requisite authority and approved the design prepared by
Mr. Watson.

As a result, the City of Lewiston submits that the appropriate

administrative employees of the City approved the

ign of the bubble-up water

system.
The Thompsons assert that the City must establish that the City Council
itself must approve the design.

In this case, and in many cases involving

governmental boards, the members of the boards are not engineers or architects.
In some cases, the drawings, sketches and specifications can involve multiple
pages or electrical, plumbing, mechanical, structural, heating and air-conditioning
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technical symbols and terminology. Such technical drawings and sketches may be
comprehended by architects and engineers, but may be incomprehensible to a City
Councilmen or other government board members. In such an event, it is appropriate
for

the

governmental

entity

to

utilize

persons/employees

with

appropriate

education, credentials, training and experience to review, draft and approve such
plans or designs. Such individuals will have a better idea and understanding of the
plans or design and will be better equipped to evaluate such plans or designs.
Here, the design or plan in question was prepared by the City's Assistant
Engineer.

The City Engineer approved the design, as did the City's Public Works

Director. The City asserts that the approval of the drawings or plans by the City's
Engineer and/or Director of Public Works is sufficient to meet the requirements of
the statute and

to support design immunity under I.C. §6-904(7).

Further,

because the City Council approved the project and authorized the expenditure of

$8

557.46 for the project prior to the commencement of construction, the City

has met the requirements of I.C. §6-904(7) and is

to design immunity.

Thus, the Court's denial of the City's Motion for design immunity should be
reversed.

V.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the City submits that the District Court's decision
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against the City on the grounds of discretionary
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immunity is correct.

The Thompsons have asserted that the design prepared by

Mr. Watson is inadequate and failed to contain sufficient specific information such
that no plan or design exists.

Idaho law does not require a design or plan to be in

writing. (Lawton, supra at 459). Thus, the lack of specifics in a drawing does not
justify or support a claim that no plan or designs exists. However, for purposes of
summary judgment only and accepting the Thompsons' argument that there is no
design or plan, the issue then becomes whether the decision to replace the valley
gutter is a discretionary decision under I.C. §6-904(1).

Here, the undisputed

testimony is that the decision to change the type of gutter was primarily based
upon traffic

issues.

Under Idaho

law,

decisions

pertaining

to

traffic

are

discretionary decisions, and discretionary immunity applies. Therefore, the District
Court's decision granting the City Summary Judgment based upon discretionary
immunity is correct and should be affirmed,
The other issue before this Court pertains to design immunity.

The City

asserts that the District Court erred when it denied the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment based upon

I.e.

§6-904(7).

In this case, the design in question was

prepared by the City's Assistant Engineer, approved by the City Engineer and the
City's Director of Public Works.

Thus, the City submits that the design was in

substantial conformance with engineering or design standards at the time the
design was prepared.

Additionally, the project was approved and funded by the

City Council before the commencement of the construction. Therefore, the design
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and the project were approved by legislative body or an appropriate administrative
agency (City Engineering Department and/or Department of Public Works) prior to
construction and the City is entitled to design immunity pursuant to I.C. §6-904(7}.
Therefore, the District Court's decision denying the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment based upon design immunity should be reversed and this Court should
grant the City Summary Judgment based upon design immunity and pursuant to
I.C. §6-904(7).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/6 day of November, 2012.

ANDERSON, JULI N & HULL LLP

Attorneys for Respondent
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~1ry

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of November, 2012, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by delivering the same to
each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Theodore O. Creason, ISB No. 1563
CREASON MOORE & DOKKEN
1219 Idaho Street
P.O. Drawer 835
Lewiston, 10 83501

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Brian K. Julian
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